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INTRODUCTION

The international law of treaty interpretation is based on the perspective of an objective third party, such as a court,' seeking to interpret an
agreement after it has been negotiated. The result is a legal regime that
attempts unnecessarily to apply a uniform approach to all treaty provisions and which places primary emphasis on resolving disputes rather
than on enforcing the parties' intent. This approach takes insufficient
account of the actual process of treaty negotiation, undercuts the legitimacy of the court's interpretation and potentially diminishes the effectiveness of treaties as a means of governing international relations. International law needs a theory of treaty interpretation based not on the
perspective of a court but rather on that of a negotiator. This essay offers
such a theory.
The essay is divided into four parts. Part I, the Introduction, will discuss the purposes of the international law of treaty interpretation and
define some terms to be used in the subsequent analysis. Part II will
then summarize and analyze the current international law of treaty interpretation. Part III will provide a case study of a treaty negotiation
which offers a basis for a different approach to treaty interpretation.
Finally, Part IV will outline a theory of treaty interpretation from a
negotiator's perspective.
A.

The Tasks of Treaty Interpretation

This Article concerns primarily the contrasting perspectives of negotiators and courts in interpreting international agreements. A useful first
step in comparing the two points of view is to identify the purposes of
treaty interpretation in order to formulate a standard against which one
can evaluate the two perspectives.
Parties generally negotiate a treaty hoping to narrow the range of potential future disputes and thereby assure themselves a relatively stable
position in their future international relations.2 Thus, as a general rule,
treaty negotiators seek provisions that are as determinant3 as possible.
1. This Article will use the term "court" as a generic reference to all third-party
entities that may be requested to interpret a treaty or other international agreement.
2. For a discussion of the general problem of achieving stable expectations in a treaty
relationship, see R. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
(1981).
3. Probably no one asserts that treaty language is always determinant of all disputes
concerning its application. David Kennedy argues for the opposite view, that treaty language is never determinant of any dispute. Kennedy, Theses About InternationalLegal
Discourse, 23 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 353 (1980). Kennedy contends that those who are
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To the extent relevant treaty provisions are not determinant of a particular dispute, parties must negotiate an agreed interpretation of a
treaty, which, in effect, adds new meaning to the agreement. Thus, parties continue to negotiate agreements even after the agreements have en4
tered into force.
, Negotiations subsequent to a treaty's entry into force differ, however,
in at least two material respects from prior negotiations. First, a treaty's
entry into force freezes the conceptual content and vocabulary of the negotiations. Parties negotiate on the assumption that they can and should
resolve their dispute through application of treaty terms already in force
rather than through the insertion of new terms. This is consistent with
the premise that the purpose of a treaty is to achieve stability in international relations. Thus, after a treaty enters into force, a party cannot
make any demand that it could not defend as an explicit or implicit
treaty requirement.
The second difference is that in many cases parties will designate a
third party to resolve their dispute through adjudication.' In theory,
whether parties resolve a dispute through negotiations or adjudication,
the issue is the same:6 what result does the treaty mandate? In neither
case do parties claim they are making a new treaty; in both cases they

sufficiently skilled at the reasoning process can argue with equal logical force that any
text has either of two mutually incompatible meanings and that anyone convinced of a
particular interpretation by treaty language merely deludes himself. Id. at 357.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that Kennedy is right, experience does suggest
nevertheless that there are cases in which virtually all observers will reach the same
interpretation. Call it mass delusion, but countless number of times each day, treaties are
applied without disputes arising because all participants find themselves in accord on the
treaty's meaning; indeed, most participants do not imagine that the treaty could have any
other meaning. An unconditional most-favored-nation provision in a trade agreement, for
example, permits the goods of a treaty partner to be imported subject to a particular
tariff schedule. Thousands of import transactions may occur without the importer or a
treaty party ever considering that a different tariff rate applies. The author regards as
highly determinant a provision which induces this broad agreement that only one interpretation is correct. A particular provision, of course, may be more determinant of some
disputes than of others.
4. One commentator refers, for example, to the "prolonged and hard bargaining
characterized by mutual concessions" that follows entry into force of the treaty. See
Schreuer, The Interpretationof Treaties By Domestic Courts, 1971 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
255, 283.
5. This Article will use the term "adjudication" to refer generically to all procedures
by which a third party resolves a treaty dispute.
6. The concept of a court as a facilitator in the negotiations between parties is discussed in Gross, Treaty Interpretation:The Proper Role of an InternationalTribunal,
1969 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 108, 109 (1969).
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say they are defining a treaty already made. 7 In negotiations, each attempts to persuade the other of its interpretation. In adjudication, the
parties abandon their attempts to persuade each other and seek to persuade a third party.8
Thus, regardless of whether parties resolve a dispute through negotiation or adjudication, the international law of treaty interpretation faces
the same two tasks. The first is to find techniques to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that genuinely determinant provisions are given effect. The second is to find a theory of treaty interpretation that can define indeterminant treaty provisions without abandoning the treaty as the
basis for dispute resolution.
B.

Definitions

Before assessing whether the international law of treaties is well
suited to these tasks, it is useful to define some terms necessary to that
assessment. One may regard a treaty as consisting of either rules or standards.9 The legal community frequently expresses this distinction as the
difference between the letter and the spirit of an agreement or the text
and its intention.1
Those who consider a treaty as settifig forth a collection of rules focus
7. At times, of course, it is clear that an existing treaty is inadequate and the parties
may decide to negotiate a new one. In such a case, however, the rules of treaty interpretation are not regarded as theoretically controlling the outcome. Accordingly, such cases
do not concern us here. There may also be instances in which it is unclear whether the
parties regard themselves as negotiating the meaning of an existing agreement or negotiating a new one. Suffice it to say that parties never ask a court to negotiate a new
agreement.
8. For a suggestion that there is a great difference between negotiating and adjudicating a dispute, see Summary Records of the 870th Meeting, [1966] I Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 186, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966 (Comments of Shabtai Rosenne) [here-

inafter 870th Meeting].
9. A rule is a statement of the conduct required of a party. A standard is a statement
of a goal toward which a party should direct its conduct. Thus, for example, a prohibition on driving in excess of 25 m.p.h. is a rule. A requirement that one drive safely is a
standard. One may think of a rule as a particular case or application of a corresponding
standard. The choice between rules and standards, then, is reducible to the question, at
what level of generality should one define a party's obligations? Thus, as noted in the
text below, because a rule is merely a particularized application of a standard, rules and
standards are not mutually exclusive.
10. See, e.g., Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
(Advisory Opinion), 1950 I.C.J. 221; 870th Meeting, supra note 8, at 190 (Comments of
Eduardo Jimfnez de Ar~chaga); Summary Records of 871st Meeting, [1966] I Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 193, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/186 (Comments of Antonio de Luna) [here-

inafter 871st Meeting].
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on the words of the agreement."' In their view the parties have fulfilled
the agreement if they have obeyed its rules-that is, if they have followed the words literally.
Those who view a treaty as a collection of standards focus on the
spirit of the agreement, of which the words are but an expression. In
their view the parties have fulfilled the agreement if they have satisfied
its underlying purpose-that is, if the parties have obeyed the spirit of
the agreement, even if such an interpretation requires one to strain the
meaning of the treaty's language.
While rules and standards are conceptually distinct, no treaty provision can be a pure rule or a pure standard. 2 We apply even the clearest
of rules only because we sense a more general purpose or standard behind such rules without thinking.13 That is, we understand that every
rule embodies a standard. At the same time, a pure standard provides a
set of obligations too ill-defined for application or use as the basis for an
international agreement. 4
Thus, the two views of treaty content are not mutually exclusive. Even
the strongest adherent of one view will recognize at least some validity in
the other. The difference is whether one regards a treaty provision as
being predominantly a rule or a standard. The rule-theorist generally
will not insist on a reading of the text so literal as to render the agreement completely ineffective or to produce an absurd result. 5 In other
words, rule-theorists generally follow the rules only as long as the rules
do not completely vitiate the underlying standard or an implied standard

11.
12.
13.

See, e.g., 870th Meeting, supra note 8, at 188 (Comments of Paul Reuter).
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Gottlieb, The Interpretationof Treaties by Tribunals, 1969 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.

PROC. 122, 125.

14. Id. at 129; 870th Meeting, supra note 8, at 197 (Comments of Mustafa Kamil
Yasseen).
Parties to an international agreement seek to reduce uncertainty in their international
relations. A treaty provision that is not, to some extent, specific and determinant will be
inadequate to accomplish that purpose. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
15. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties May 23, 1969, Rule 32, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]; see infra text accompanying note 41. See Waldock, Third Report on the
Law of Treaties, [1964] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 5, 57 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167 and
Add.1-3 [hereinafter Waldock, Third Report]; Polish Postal Service in Danzig (Poland,
Free City of Danzig), 1925 PCIJ (ser. B) No. 11, at 39 (May 16); Competence of the
General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8;
Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: with Special Reference to the
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 318, 319 (1969).
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of reasonableness. Similarly, standards-theorists generally do not insist
on a result that is simply irreconcilable with any possible reading of the
text. Standards-theorists believe they are entitled to read words creatively, but without disregarding them entirely, in order to give effect to
the standard."6
Whether one regards a treaty as consisting primarily of rules or of
standards, one may still adhere to one of two theories of interpretation:
objectivist or subjectivist. An objectivist interprets an agreement as he
believes an objective third party would. This theory of interpretation
may or may not reflect the intent of the parties who negotiated the
treaty. 1 Thus, for example, a court interprets words according to what
the court regards as their plain and ordinary meaning. A subjectivist
interprets an agreement as he believes the parties who negotiated the
treaty would. He interprets words not according to their plain and ordinary meaning but according to the meaning the parties actually intended
them to have.
As in the case of rules and standards, the objectivist and subjectivist
theories of interpretation are not mutually exclusive."' Few objectivists
would argue that a word should never be given a special meaning, while
most subjectivists presumably would need to see considerable evidence
before they would believe that a word really meant its opposite. 9 Again,
in the practical world the difference is one of emphasis-that is, whether
one inclines toward objectivism or subjectivism.

16. Cf I.
(1973).

SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

70-71

17. See, e.g., Summary Records of the 872nd Meeting, [1966] I Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 201, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/186 (Comments of Eduardo Jim~nez de Ar&haga)
[hereinafter 872nd Meeting]. In the parlance of United States law, this objective third
party is often described as the "reasonable person." See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 149-66 (4th ed. 1971)

18. Because every transaction is unique at some level of specificity, a word that describes similar transactions means something slightly unique in each context. A word
thus has infinite shades of meaning. Yet the community peiceives a generalized core
meaning that is largely present in each context. The choice between an objectivist and a
subjectivist theory of interpretation, then, is reducible to the question, at what level of
generality shall a word be defined? The subjectivist seeks the particular shade; the objectivist the general core. Thus, because the general and the particular meanings may overlap, objectivism and subjectivism are not mutually exclusive in a given case.
19. Cf Access to, or Anchorage in, the Port of Danzig, of Polish War Vessels (Advisory Opinion), 1931 PCIJ, (ser. A/B) No. 43, at 144 (Dec. 11). "The court is not
prepared to adopt the view that the text of the Treaty of Versailles can be enlarged by
reading into it stipulations which are said to result from the proclaimed intentions of the
authors of the Treaty, but for which no provision is made in the text itself." Id.
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II.
A.

TREATY INTERPRETATION: CURRENT LAW

The PrincipalSchools of Treaty Interpretation

Commentators generally recognize three principal schools of treaty interpretation.20 These three approaches ostensibly share a common premise: that the validity of an international agreement rests solely on the
will or consent of the parties to be bound and, therefore, treaty interpretation is the process of attempting to establish the content of that consent.21 The difference in the approaches, then, at least in theory, is one
of means.22
The first method, the textual approach, regards actual treaty text as
the essence of an agreement between parties.23 In this view, the negotiating history is likely to be inconclusive or even misleading.2 The textual
approach limits itself to the only expression of intent that both parties
unambiguously adopted-the treaty itself 2 5-and seeks to interpret the
language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. 26 The principal
objection to the textual approach is that, because terms often have no
ordinary meaning,"27 the text is virtually always subject to more than one
20. See I. SINCLAIR, supra note 16, at 70-73; T. ELIAs, THE MODERN LAW OF
72 (1974); Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the InternationalCourt
of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 1951 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1-6 (1951) [hereinafter Fitzmaurice, 1951]; Waldock, Third Report, supra note
15, at 53. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Eighteenth
Session, [1966] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 172, 218; Jacobs, supra note 15, at 318;
Schreuer, supra note 4, at 272.
21. Harvard Law School, Research in InternationalLaw, Part III, Law of Treaties, art. 19, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 939, (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research].
22. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice
1951-4: Treaty Interpretationand Other Treaty Points, 1957 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 203,
204 [hereinafter Fitzmaurice, 1957]; Fitzmaurice, 1951, supra note 20, at 2. The exception may be the extreme teleological approach, discussed infra at note 34.
23. Fitzmaurice, 1957, supra note 22, at 204-07; I. SINCLAIR, supra note 16, at 71;
Jacobs, supra note 15, at 319.
24. Reports of the InternationalLaw Commission on the work of its Eighteenth Session, supra note 20, at 220.
25. M. Huber, 44-1 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUr DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 199
(1952); 871st Meeting, supra note 10, at 193 (Comments of Antonio de Luna); Fitzmaurice, 1951, supra note 20, at 7.
26. Jacobs, supra note 15, at 322-23; Fitzmaurice, 1951, supra note 20, at 7-8;
Fitzmaurice, 1957, supra note 22, at 205; Gottlieb, supra note 13, at 123; Report of the
InternationalLaw Commission on the work of its Eighteenth Session, supra note 20, at
221; Waldock, Third Report, supra note 15, at 56 (The "natural and ordinary meaning
of the terms is the very essence of the textual approach.").
27. See, e.g., Schwarzenberger, Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation:Articles 27-29 of the Vienna Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,
TREATIES
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reading. Thus, the court seeking to interpret an agreement may be imposing its own meaning-in effect, enforcing an agreement the parties
28

never made.

The second method, the subjective approach,2 9 regards the parties' actual intentions underlying an agreement as being the essence of the
agreement 30 and looks to the negotiating history to determine these intentions. The objection to this approach is that parties may not have had
any views on the disputed issue-that is, the intention of the parties may
be as fictitious as the plain meaning of the term. In addition, the negotiating history may be no more illuminating than the text. It may be silent
on crucial points as well as misleading, confusing, one-sided or inconclusive." Adherents to this approach are open to the criticism that they are
enforcing an agreement that one or both parties wanted to make or
might have made, rather than the one the parties actually did make.
The third method, the teleological approach, interprets the treaty text
in light of its apparent overall object and purpose as gleaned from the
text.2 The teleological approach suffers from the same criticism as the

13 (1968) and sources cited therein; 870th Meeting, supra note 8, at 188 (Comments of
Herbert W. Briggs); id. at 191-92 (Comments of Milan Bartos); Jacobs, supra note 15,
at 340; McDougal, The InternationalLaw Commission's Draft Articles Upon Interpretation: Textuality Redivivus, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 992 (1967); Lauterpacht, Some Observations on PreparatoryWorks in the Interpretationof Treaties, 48 HARv. L. REV. 549,
571 (1935) ("[fln no circumstances ought preparatory work to be excluded on the ground
that the treaty is clear in itself. Nothing is absolutely clear in itself.")
28. Hyde, Judge Anzilotti on the Interpretationof Treaties, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 502
(1933); A. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 366 (1945); Fitzmaurice, 1951, supra note 20,
at 2 n.1; Gottlieb, supra note 13, at 126; Falk, On Treaty Interpretation and the New
Haven Approach: Achievements and Prospects, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 323, 332-334 (1968).
29. One must distinguish the subjective approach from the more general theory of
subjectivism. This essay will describe the second traditional approach to treaty interpretation exclusively through the term "subjective approach." The terms "subjectivism," or
"subjectivist" will refer to the more general theory See supra text accompanying notes
17-19.
30. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 15, at 319; Lauterpacht, 43(1) ANNUAIRE DE
L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 366-434 (1950); Summary Records of the
765th Meeting, [1964] I Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 279-280, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167/
Add.3 (Comments of Milan Bartos).
31. See Fitzmaurice, 1951, supra note 20, at 2 n.1, 4-5; Fitzmaurice, 1957, supra
note 22, at 205-06; Jacobs, supra note 15, at 318.
32. Jacobs, supra note 15, at 318-20; I. SINCLAIR, supra note 16, at 75; Harvard
Research, supra note 21, at 939; Fitzmaurice, 1951, supra note 20, at 2 n.1. See, e.g.,
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion), 1951 I.C.J. 15, 53 (May 28) (dissenting opinion of Judge
Alvarez).
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textual approach: the court may in fact be reading a different purpose
into the agreement than the parties did. In addition, the teleological approach suffers a further deficiency intrinsic to its nature: it threatens to
push all the provisions of a treaty toward a particular goal, whereas the
parties may have intended a treaty to represent a compromise among
conflicting goals.3" Thus, for example, a treaty that protects investments
provides certain specific protections, not carte blanche protection for investors. The teleological approach offers no formula for choosing which
of several conflicting goals to further in any given case.34
Although the literature does not generally discuss other methods of
treaty interpretation, one can identify a fourth approach, the quasi-textual approach. This approach, similar to the textual approach, regards
text as the essence of an agreement. Rather than interpreting words according to their plain and ordinary meaning, however, the quasi-textual
approach seeks to interpret them in the manner the parties intended.35

33. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the teleological approach should refer in the plural to "objects and purposes." Gottlieb, supra note 13, at 126. Another
noted that the singular reference to "object and purpose" in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, see infra text accompanying note 36, may have been an attempt to
focus interpretation on the "principal object and purpose," thereby reducing the potential
for controversy concerning "which of several possibly conflicting objects and purposes
should determine the meaning of a disputed term." Jacobs, supra note 15, at 337.
34. The teleological approach originated largely as an approach to interpreting multilateral conventions, although it can obviously apply to bilateral agreements as well. See
Waldock, Third Report, supra note 15, at 53-4; Fitzmaurice, 1951, supra note 20, at 2.
One may, in fact, subdivide the teleological approach into a moderate school and an
extreme school. For the moderate teleological approach see supra text accompanying
note 32. The extreme teleological approach, which is associated primarily with the interpretation of multilateral agreements, draws the purpose not merely from the text but
from a broader inquiry into the circumstances of the agreement's drafting, its subsequent
operation or its role in international life. Practitioners of the extreme teleological approach may make no pretense of following the intentions of the framers of a treaty; the
treaty takes on a justification of its own independent of the intent of the drafters. Fitzmaurice, 1951, supra note 20, at 2-4; Fitzmaurice, 1957, supra note 22, at 207-09. See,
e.g., 1951 I.C.J. at 53 (dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez). As discussed herein, the
teleological approach will refer to the moderate school.
35. As in the case of the teleological approach, one may identify two schools within
the quasi-textual approach. The restrictive school requires that any special meaning be
apparent from the text. This appears to be the approach the International Law Commission (ILC) took in drafting what became the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
See Waldock, Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties, [1966] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 51,
100, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/186 and Add.1-7. Indeed, one member of the ILC went so far
as to say that a special meaning should be acceptable only if explicitly set forth in the
text. See Summary Records of the 770th Meeting, [1964] I Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 318,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/171 (Comments of Angel M. Paredes) [hereinafter 770th Meeting].
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Vienna Convention) codify the current international law of treaty
interpretation. 6
The starting point for treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention is the text itself and the context other texts provide. One must read
the text, however, in light of its apparent object and purpose. In other
words, the Vienna Convention adopts the textual approach,37 with the
The more liberal school consults the negotiating history to determine any such special
meanings. See, e.g., C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY As INTERPRETED BY
THE UNITED STATES Vol.
PRETED];

II, at 1470 (1945) [hereinafter C.

HYDE, CHIEFLY INTER-

Hyde, Concerningthe Interpretationof Treaties, 3 AM. J.

[hereinafter Hyde, Concerning Interpretation].See also Y. CHANG,

INT'L

L. 46 (1909)

THE INTERPRETA-

TION OF TREATIES BY JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS 182 (1933) ("[T]he function of the interpreter is simply to discover and ascertain, with the aid of various sources of evidence, the
sense in which the contracting parties actually employed particular terms in a treaty.");
T. Yu, THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 43 (1927) ("[T]he initial task of interpretation is the seeking out of the sense... in which the contracting parties employed particular terms.")
36. Vienna Convention, supra note 15, arts. 31, 32. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides:
General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connexion [sic] with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion [sic]
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended.
The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, but regards it as declarative
of customary international law in many respects. See Briggs, United States Ratification
of the Vienna Treaty Convention, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 470 (1979).
37. Jacobs, supra note 15, at 326. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on
the work of its Eighteenth Sessibn, supra note 20, at 220-21 ("[T]he starting point of
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teleological approach used on an ancillary basis to assist with textual
analysis.3" It also includes the quasi-textual approach as an acceptable,
albeit less-preferred, approach. 9
The Vienna Convention clearly has relegated the subjective approach
to subsidiary importance.40 Only if the article 31 textual analysis leaves
an unclear or absurd result can the interpreter turn to the negotiating
41
history.

interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio
into the intentions of the parties."); Waldock, Third Report, supra note 15, at 56. In its
primary orientation toward the textual approach, the Vienna Convention codified customary international law and, in particular, the practice of the International Court of
Justice. See T. ELIAS, supra note 20, at 77; Fitzmaurice, 1951, supra note 20, at 6-8;
Fitzmaurice, 1957, supra note 22, at 209-10. As the Court has noted,
the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their
natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the
matter.
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations
(Advisory Opinion), 1950 I.C.J. at 8. See also Conditions of Admission of a State to
Membership in the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), 1948 I.C.J. 57, 63 (May 28)
("The Court considers that the text is sufficiently clear; consequently, it does not feel that
it should deviate from the consistent practice of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, according to which there is no occasion to resort to preparatory work if the text
of the Convention is sufficiently clear in itself.").
38. I. SINCLAIR, supra note 16, at 75.
39. Special Rapporteur Waldock, who drafted the language that became article
31(4), even expressed doubts concerning whether to include the provision. See Summary
Records of the 769th Meeting, [1964] I Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 309, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/171 [hereinafter 769th Meeting].
40. As Schreuer points out, "Neither Article 31 nor 32 contains any reference to
intention and the dominant Article 31 is drafted in a very objectivist manner." Schreuer,
supra note 4, at 274. See also Jacobs, supra note 15, at 325; Sinclair, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 19 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 47, 60 (1970) [hereinafter Sinclair,
Vienna Convention]. This too is consistent with customary international law and the
practice of the ICJ. See Fitzmaurice, 1951, supra note 20, at 7-8.
41. Article 32 provides specifically:
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine
the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
"[I]t
is permissible to fix the meaning of the terms by reference to evidence or indications
of the intentions of the parties outside the ordinary sense of their words" only in the case
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C. An Analysis of Current Law
The following chart diagrams the relationship among the four approaches to treaty interpretation. The chart categorizes each approach
according to whether the approach regards the content of a treaty primarily as rules or as standards, and whether it is objectivist or subjectivist in its theory of interpretation. The provision of the Vienna Convention that authorizes each approach appears in parentheses. 2
Rules

Standards

Objectivist

Textual Approach
(Article 31(1))

Teleological Approach
(Article 31(1))

Subjectivist

Quasi-Textual Approach
(Article 31(4))

Subjective Approach
(Article 32)

The textual approach, then, regards an agreement as consisting of
rules that one should interpret as a third party would-that is, according
to their objective meaning. The teleological approach differs from the
textual approach in that it regards the underlying standards of an agreement as controlling, but shares with the textual approach an objectivist
theory of interpretation under which the standard is not necessarily that
of the parties themselves but of an objective third party. The quasi-textual approach shares with the textual approach an emphasis on interpreting the actual text of an agreement but differs in that it interprets
the text subjectively, as the parties would, rather than as an objective
third party would. Finally, the subjective approach is the opposite of the
textual approach. It shares with the teleological approach a view of the
treaty as consisting primarily of standards and, like the quasi-textual
approach, adopts a subjective theory of interpretation: the standards are
those agreed to by the parties, not those apparent to an objective third
party.
The Vienna Convention codifies a primarily objectivist theory of
where "either the natural and ordinary meaning of the terms in their context does not
give a viable result or for one reason or another the meaning is not clear." Waldock,
Third Report, supra note 15, at 57. Note that the negotiating history is also available to
confirm, but not vary, the meaning of a clear text. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
42. Rule 32 authorizes reliance on the negotiating history and thus makes possible a
subjectivist theory of interpretation. It does not, however, explicitly authorize the subjectivist approach.
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treaty interpretation. Both the textual approach and the teleological approach, the preferred approaches under rule 31(1), are objectivist. Words
have the meaning that the court, as a third party, gives them. To the
extent that some sense of an underlying standard is necessary to illuminate the text, it is the court's version of the parties' purpose which serves
that function.
Subjectivism is acceptable as a primary method of treaty interpretation
if it is in the form of a subjective reading of the text. That is, a court
may give a word a special meaning rather than its ordinary meaning,
but only if a party can specifically prove such special meaning. A court is
under no independent obligation to look for a special meaning and the
presumption is against one.43 A subjectivist interpretation of the underlying standard is acceptable only as a secondary approach, if all else fails.
The Vienna Convention also prefers a rule orientation over a standards orientation. It prefers the textual approach somewhat more than
the teleological approach: both are objectivist, but only the former is
rule-oriented. Likewise, it prefers the quasi-textual approach to the subjective approach. Both are subjectivist, but again the former is ruleoriented.
The exception to the Vienna Convention's preference for rules over
standards lies in the relationship between the teleological approach and
the quasi-textual approach. Clearly, the Vienna Convention prefers the
standards-oriented teleological approach to the rule-oriented quasi-textual approach. The inference is that the distinction between the objectivist and subjectivist approaches is more important than the distinction between rule orientation and standards orientation. That is, objectivism is
always preferable to subjectivism, even when the latter is applied to
treaty text. The teleological approach is objectivist and thus, despite its
standards orientation, is preferable to the subjectivist quasi-textual approach. The rule orientation of the quasi-textual approach, even the restrictive version that the Vienna Convention embodies, cannot rescue the
approach from the sin of subjectivism.
That objectivism is more important than rule orientation is perhaps

43. T. ELIAS, supra note 20, at 78. As the Permanent Court of International Justice
observed, "if it is alleged by one of the Parties that some unusual or exceptional meaning
is to be attributed to [the word 'Greenland'], it lies on that Party to establish its content."
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J, (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 49. Special
meanings must be "established conclusively" by "decisive proof." Waldock, Third Report, supra note 15, at 57. See also Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership
in the United Nations, 1948 I.C.J. at 57, 63 ("To warrant an interpretation other than
that which ensues from the natural meaning of the words, a decisive reason would be
required.").
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surprising because the rhetoric of international legal debates suggests just
the opposite. The very name "textual approach" implies that adherence
to text rather than objectivism is the essence of the approach. In explaining its preference for the textual approach in what would become the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the International Law Commission emphasized that the starting point of treaty interpretation is the
text rather than the intent of the parties."' Thus, what was advertised as
the triumph of rule theory over standards theory was, to a much greater
extent, a triumph of objectivism over subjectivism.
To understand why international law would prefer objectivism over
subjectivism while portraying the preference as one of rules over standards, it is useful to consider treaty interpretation from the perspective
that underlies the Vienna Convention, that of a court. A court examining
a treaty for the first time immediately can distinguish between two types
of treaty provisions: those that appear clear on their face and those that
do not. If a court regards the provision as clear, the Vienna Convention
requires it to apply an objective interpretation in the form of the textual
and teleological approaches. As noted above,4 objectivists interpret rules
and standards as a third party would rather than as the treaty parties
themselves would. Thus, in applying the textual and teleological approaches, the court seeks not to enforce the actual intent of the parties,
but merely to settle the dispute in accordance with a third-party interpretation. Only in the case of the second type of treaty provision, those
that the court cannot explain through recourse to a third-party interpretation, will the court seek to determine the actual intent of the parties.
One of the goals of treaty interpretation is to enforce the will of the
parties. 4 ' The textual approach claims to meet this goal by defining the
will of the parties as that which they embodied in the text. What this
approach largely ignores, however, is that the meaning given to the text
is not necessarily that of the parties, but of an objective third party. As
this suggests, the Vienna Convention, contrary to theory, does not seek
primarily to enforce the will of the parties, but to settle disputes.
Of course, courts do not participate in treaty negotiations and have no
institutional stake in effecting the arrangement worked out in them.
Rather, courts need first and foremost to resolve disputes in a manner
that is authoritative and convincing.47 Objectivism meets that need. By

44.
eenth
45.
46.
47.

See, e.g., Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the work of its EightSession, supra note 20, at 220.
See supra text accompanying note 17.
See supra text accompanying note 21.
Cf. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1947 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. (ser.
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elevating third-party interpretation to primary importance, objectivism
provides courts with a theory that renders the court's interpretation, by
definition, as authoritative as any party could offer. If the role of treaty
interpretation is to ascribe to terms their plain and ordinary meaning, a
court can do that as well as anyone.
Objectivism, then, elevates a court's institutional need to resolve disputes authoritatively over the goal of enforcing an agreement in accordance with the will of the parties. In short, the injection of a new institution-the courts-into treaty interpretation changes the goal of that
endeavor-from enforcing the will of the parties to settling the dispute.
With the submission of a dispute to a court, treaty provisions will be
regarded not from the negotiator's perspective, but from a court's
perspective.
Courts offer no principled justification, however, for placing a thirdparty interpretation above the parties' intentions. Indeed, as already
noted,48 the textual approach asserts that it is seeking to enforce the parties' intent, but only as revealed in the text. In fact, by relegating the
parties' intent to secondary importance, traditional treaty interpretation
abandons the principle on which it bases its legitimacy as law.
The foregoing analysis suggests why international law's embrace of
objectivism occurs behind a facade of rule orientation. Objectivism seems
to provide a basis for a court's authority, while in fact it undercuts its
legitimacy. The result is that the advocates of a textual approach prefer
to frame the debate as one between hard rules or text and soft standards
or intentions."9 These hard rules, commentators have said, circumscribe
the discretion of the court and ensure fidelity to the parties' intentions.
One can depict those who advocate the subjective approach as being judicial legislators seeking to impose their will on the parties through unfettered interpretation of nebulous standards.
Whatever rigor adherence to the text imposes,5" however, is diminished by the embrace of objectivism."' It matters little that a court is

D) 37, art. 38(1), at 76 (The purpose of that body "is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it.").
48. See supra text accompanying note 25.
49. Cf. Falk, supra note 28, at 344.
50. I have argued that language is sometimes determinant, and I believe that adherence to the text imposes some restriction on a court's discretion. See supra note 3. In
some cases, a court knows that the international legal community would not regard a
particular interpretation of a treaty as credible, however logically defensible.
51. I do not mean to suggest that objectivism permits unbridled discretion. There are
some interpretations of a word that one cannot plausibly defend as the plain and ordinary meaning. An objectivist court will find certain interpretations foreclosed. Neverthe-
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bound to text if the court can supply its own meaning to the text.
The elevation of the goal of dispute settlement over that of enforcing
the will of the parties raises both a principled and a practical objection.
The principled objection already has been stated: the international law of
treaty interpretation rests its legitimacy on a claim that it is, in fact,
enforcing the will of the parties.
The practical objection is that states may become disillusioned with a
law of treaty interpretation that interprets treaties differently than they
were written and thus may place less reliance on treaties as a means of
ordering international relations.5 2 That such an outcome is not demonstrably occurring may be attributable to two factors. First, the court's
objectivist interpretation may often coincide with at least one party's subjectivist interpretation. 3 In such cases, resort to objectivism rather than
subjectivism may not have any practical consequences.
Second, it is unclear that courts in practice really adhere to international law as codified in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.
The cornerstone of the Vienna Convention is its requirement that courts
refrain from inquiring into the parties' actual intentions if the provision
to be interpreted is clear on its face. The Vienna Convention does allow
a court to refer to the negotiating history, however, even when the treaty
text is clear, in order to confirm its interpretation-a rule that borders
on the absurd. If the meaning is clear, a court need not confirm it, and
examining the negotiating history serves no point.5 4 If a court examines
the negotiating history anyway but in fact disconfirms the plain meaning, the court has no basis for following the interpretation that the history reveals. 55
This absurdity is not manifest in practice because courts probably
scrutinize the negotiating history whether the text seems clear or not. If
the negotiating history supports a court's first impression, then the court

less, provided a court is within the realm of plausibility, objectivism permits it to legislate
in an unrestricted manner, unfettered by even a theoretical need to ascertain the true
intent of the parties.
52. Compare Lauterpacht's warning that "[a]n international court which yields conspicuously to the urge to modify existing law ... may bring about a drastic curtailment
of its activity," Gross, supra note 6, at 113.
53. Indeed, as one commentator notes, "[a]ll three approaches are capable, in a given
case, of producing the same result in practice." Fitzmaurice, 1951, supra note 20, at 2.
54. See, e.g., Summary Records of the 766th Meeting, [1964] I Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 283, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167/Add.3; 769th Meeting, supra note 39, at 314;
770th Meeting, supra note 35, at 317 (Comments of Jose M. Ruda).
55. For a similar view, see 769th Meeting, supra note 39, at 314 (Comments of
Mustafa Kamil Yasseen); Jacobs, supra note 15, at 327.
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labels the text as clear and can cite the negotiating history as confirming
that meaning in accordance with article 32.56 If the negotiating history
disconfirms the court's first impression, it can disregard it and cite its
first impression as the clear meaning of the text or, alternatively, declare
the text ambiguous and refer to the negotiating history in accordance
with article 32. 5 7 Of course, this procedure is contrary to the law as
codified in articles 31 and 32, under which the negotiating history cannot
vary the meaning of a clear textual provision.
It is thus possible that we need not fear dire consequences from application of the traditional law of treaty interpretation because courts do
not really follow the traditional law. Such an explanation undercuts the
necessity for changing the traditional law as a matter of practicality,
while proving the necessity as a matter of principle.
III.

TREATY NEGOTIATIONS:

A CASE STUDY

The thesis of this Article is that international law needs a theory of
treaty interpretation grounded on the perspective of a negotiator rather
than on that of a court. In order to develop such a theory, it is helpful to
describe the process of negotiation.
Set forth below is a case study of a typical bilateral treaty negotiation.
The procedure does not necessarily describe all bilateral treaty negotiations. Believing that one flaw in the current international law of treaty
interpretation is the effort to be too general and cover too many different
types of agreements, the author has eschewed any attempt to provide a
universally applicable account of treaty negotiations. Rather, this case
study addresses a particular type of treaty: a bilateral treaty that one
state negotiates with two or more other states and which is based on a
model negotiating text.5 This Article will refer to such agreements as

56. McNair comments, for example, on the "numerous cases" in which a court asserts that since the text is clear, there is no need to examine the negotiating history even
though the court already has examined such history prior to making the assertion. See A.
McNAIR, supra note 28, at 413.
57.

See, e.g., 766th Meeting, supra note 54, at 283 (Comments of Shabtai Rosenne)

("[T]o state that the travaux prkparatoireshad been used only to confirm an opinion
already arrived at on the basis of the text of the treaty was coming close to a legal fiction
...

[I]t was particularly difficult to accept the proposition that the travaux

pr~paratoireshad not actually contributed to form their opinion as to the meaning of a
treaty which, nevertheless, they stated to be clear from its text."). See also 769th Meet-

ing, supra note 39, at 314(65) (Comments of Special Rapporteur Waldock), id. at 314
(Comments of Shabtai Rosenne); 766th Meeting, supra note 54, at 285 (Comments of

Antonio de Luna).
58.

While certain observations made in this case study may have some application to
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bilateral series agreements. These agreements may cover diverse areas
such as trade, investment, navigation, aviation, consular relations or legal
assistance. 59
Because this Article will describe treaty interpretation from a negotiator's perspective, it is essential that the description correctly depict how
parties actually negotiate a treaty series. The following model is based
on the manner in which the United States negotiated its bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
The United States has signed BITs with ten other countries. 0 The

multilateral or other bilateral agreements, no claim is made that they do. There is a
much greater difference between the negotiation of multilateral agreements and the negotiation of bilateral agreements than among the negotiation of various types of bilateral
agreements. Thus, the case study is least likely to offer meaningful insights into multilateral treaty negotiations.
59. For a listing of United States treaties, see DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN
FORCE, an annual listing of treaties and other international agreements of the United
States in force on January 1 of the year in which the listing is published. Bilateral
treaties are listed by country and categorized within the country listing by topic.
60. INVESTMENT TREATY WITH EGYPT, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-24, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986) (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Arab Republic of
Egypt Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Sept.
29, 1982, with a related exchange of letters signed March 11, 1985 and a Supplementary
Protocol, signed Mar. 11, 1986) [hereinafter Egypt BIT];
INVESTMENT TREATY WITH PANAMA, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-14, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986), (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama
Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, with Agreed Minutes, Oct. 27,
1982) [hereinafter Panama BIT];
INVESTMENT TREATY WITH CAMEROON, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-22, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986) (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Cameroon Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Feb. 26,
1985) [hereinafter Cameroon BIT];
INVESTMENT TREATY WITH MOROCCO, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-18, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986) (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Morocco
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, July 22, 1985)
[hereinafter Morocco BIT];
INVESTMENT TREATY WITH ZAIRE, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-17, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986) (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Zaire
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, with Protocol,
Aug. 3, 1984) [hereinafter Zaire BIT];
INVESTMENT TREATY WITH BANGLADESH, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-23, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986) (Treaty Between the United States of America and the People's Republic
of Bangladesh Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
with Protocol and Exchange of Letters, Mar. 12, 1986) [hereinafter Bangladesh BIT];
INVESTMENT TREATY WITH HAITI, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-16, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986) (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Haiti
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, with Protocol,
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purpose of these agreements is to provide protection for the investments
of nationals and companies of one country located in the other country."1
The United States began preparing a model text in 1977 but did not
complete one for negotiation until 1980. It has revised the model text
several times since first completing it. The most recent model, dated February 27, 1984, is itself in a review process that may lead to still another
model negotiating text.
Successful negotiations with a number of countries based on various
model texts commenced in early 1982 and continued through May 1986,
when the United States and Grenada signed the United States-Grenada
BIT. The United States has suspended negotiations of BITs with most
other countries pending Senate advice and consent on the ten signed
BITs.
In an effort to identify the different processes by which parties reach
agreement on individual treaty provisions, this case study will proceed
chronologically through the process of treaty negotiation. Provisions are
categorized in accordance with the process by which they were negotiated, although the categories described below are not exhaustive. The
intent is only to identify a sufficient number in order to illustrate a particular approach to treaty interpretation.

Dec. 13, 1983) [hereinafter Haiti BIT];
INVESTMENT TREATY WITH SENEGAL, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-15, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986) (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Senegal
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, with Protocol,
Dec. 6, 1983) [hereinafter Senegal BIT];
INVESTMENT TREATY WITH TURKEY, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-19, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986) (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, with Protocol,
Dec. 3, 1985) [hereinafter Turkey BIT];
INVESTMENT TREATY WITH GRENADA, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-25, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986) (Treaty Between the United States of America and Grenada Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, May 2, 1986) [hereinafter Grenada BIT].
61. Four major articles comprise the BIT. The first requires parties to provide covered investment with certain absolute standards of treatment as well as most-favorednation and national treatment. The second prohibits expropriation of covered investment
unless in accordance with certain conditions, including payment of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation. The third guarantees the right to free transferability of payments
related to an investment. The fourth provides the investor with the right to binding thirdparty arbitration of investment disputes with the host country. For a lengthy description
of the BIT program, see Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the

United States, forthcoming in 21

CORNELL INT'L

L.J. (1988).
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Stage One: Text Presentation

Generally speaking, the first stage of the negotiating process in a bilateral agreement is the text presentation, in which the drafting party provides the receiving party with a copy of the model text that the drafting
party wishes to use as a basis for negotiations. 2 The receiving party
may: (1) decide the proposed draft is too onerous and elect not to pursue
negotiations further; (2) decide to commence negotiations based on the
proposed draft; or (3) respond with a counterdraft.
A counterdraft may be a rewritten version of the proposed draft or it
may represent the receiving party's own concept of a model text. A
counterdraft itself may lead to any of several possibilities: (1) the drafting party may decide to end the negotiations when it realizes how far
apart the parties' views are; (2) the drafting party may persuade the
receiving party to abandon the counterdraft; (3) the drafting party may
decide to abandon its own model text and negotiate from the counterdraft; or (4) the parties may attempt to integrate the draft and counterdraft into a consolidated negotiating text, which will juxtapose, in some
manner, those articles of the draft and counterdraft that address similar
subjects.
B.

Stage Two: Issue Identification

Assuming the presentation of the draft, and possible presentation of a
counterdraft, do not result in the abandonment of negotiations, the parties will move to the second stage: identification of issues. Where the
parties are negotiating from one party's model text, the receiving party
will identify those portions of the model text concerning which it has
questions or to which it objects. In the case of a consolidated negotiating
text, the parties will assume that all language not common to the draft
and counterdraft is objectionable to the respective receiving parties. In
either case the general form of the problem is the same: the parties have
before them a text consisting of two types of provisions: those that are
acceptable to the receiving party and those that are not.

62. This Article will use the term "drafting party" to refer to the party that has
drafted a particular provision and is proposing it for inclusion in the treaty.
This Article will use the term "receiving party" to refer to the party to which the text
is proposed. In a particular negotiation, one party may be the drafting party with respect
to some provisions and the receiving party with respect to others.
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C. Stage Three: Issue Resolution
1. Noncontroverted Provisions
In the third stage, issue resolution, the negotiations narrow to concern
only those provisions that are not initially acceptable to the receiving
party. Acceptable provisions-that is, the noncontroverted provisions-which may in fact constitute the majority of the text, become part
of the final treaty without the parties' ever having discussed them. With
respect to these provisions, those who seek to interpret the treaty at some
later date will have before them all that the treaty negotiators themselves
had-the unadorned language of the text.
Each party may have had its own subjective intention with respect to
the noncontroverted provisions, perhaps embodied in working documents
internal to that party's government, but neither party conveyed any such
intention to the other. In the case of the drafting party, it may have
crafted the language of the provisions carefully to accomplish some welldefined goal, or it may have borrowed the language from other similar
agreements without a clear appreciation of its implications. Where the
drafting party borrowed the language, its action is comparable to that of
a private attorney copying a legal document from a form book: the goal
is to obtain whatever rights or concessions someone else obtained with
this same language without necessarily having determined precisely what
those rights and concessions are.
In the case of the receiving party, the provisions may have passed almost unnoticed, overshadowed by more controversial provisions. Where
this occurs, the receiving party will have had perhaps only the most general notion of what it was accepting. Alternatively, the receiving party
may have considered the provisions very carefully, developing a wellformed intent with respect to the provision but an intent unfortunately at
variance with that of the drafting party. 3 It is also possible, of course,
that the receiving party interpreted the provisions as the drafting party
did and was in full accord.
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, in the case of noncontroverted
provisions, one cannot know, perhaps until a dispute arises, whether the
parties had or shared any intention at all, beyond a desire or willingness
that the provision appear in the final treaty text. Of course, a dispute
does not mean that the parties were not originally in full accord. The
parties may have forgotten the meaning of a provision over time or circumstances may have caused a party to change its position.
63. See 765th Meeting, supra note 30, at 280 (Comments of Robert Ago); 870th
Meeting, supra note 8, at 186 (Comments of Shabtai Rosenne).
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Controverted Provisions

Controverted provisions are those with respect to which the receiving
party raises a question or objection. In stage three negotiations the parties attempt to reach mutual agreement to: (1) incorporate the controverted provision as originally drafted into the treaty; (2) incorporate the
controverted provision in a changed form; or (3) omit the controverted
provision from the treaty. One can divide controverted provisions into
several categories according to the manner in which the parties reached
their agreement concerning such provisions.
a.

Defined Provisions

Defined provisions are those in which the meaning of some word or
phrase is unclear to the receiving party. The receiving party's confusion
may be attributable, for example, to poor draftsmanship, the inherent
difficulties in reducing what may be a complex matter to a few simple
provisions, 4 language difficulties or unfamiliarity with a term of art.
The receiving party will request the drafting party to define the unclear
language. Once the receiving party has been given and is satisfied with a
definition, it will accept the provision as part of the treaty. What the
parties have agreed to, of course, is not the plain and ordinary meaning
of the terms in question, but the language as the drafting party defined
it.
A court charged with interpreting a defined provision at some later
date cannot find that the agreement is clear and unambiguous, no matter
how clearly the words may appear to the court. This is because the receiving party found the same provision unclear and in need of further
definition. It seems fundamental that a treaty provision that is unclear to
one of the parties is an unclear provision, whatever a court may say.65
While the text is obviously a starting point for interpretation, the bare

64. A treaty that attempts to spell everything out may be too complex to understand.
In any event, every additional sentence creates new potential difficulties and thus, all
things considered, longer provisions are harder to negotiate than shorter provisions. A
treaty that attempts to be concise, on the other hand, may leave too many gaps in the
description of the parties' obligations. See R. BILDER, supra note 2, at 119.
65. See, e.g., 766th Meeting, supra note 54, at 286, and 313 (Comments of Mustafa
Kamil Yasseen); 769th Meeting, supra note 39, at 313 (Comments of Milan Bartos); T.
Yu, supra note 35, at 55. This is the sort of statement that separates objectivists from
subjectivists. Subjectivists would agree that a provision which is unclear to one or both
parties is an unclear provision. Objectivists would disagree, asserting that if the provision
is clear to an impartial third party, then it is clear, notwithstanding the fact that one of
the parties found it otherwise.
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text was insufficient for the receiving party and, likewise, should be insufficient for a court as well. Rather, the receiving party accepted the
text only as the drafting party embellished it, and it was to this defined
text that the parties agreed. 66 A court that does not go beyond the text
has not found the parties' agreement.
b.

Explained Provisions

As in the case of a defined provision, the negotiation of an explained
provision begins with a question from the receiving party concerning the
meaning of the provision. The difference is that the ensuing explanation,
whether because of the scope of the receiving party's question or for
some other reason, extends beyond the mere definition of some terms to
include an explanation of the intent behind the provision as a whole.
This explanation becomes the basis on which the receiving party decides
to accept the provision. The text alone was insufficient. The explanation
is, thus in fact, the subject of the agreement, with the text serving merely
as a mutually-agreed means of encapsulating the underlying agreement.
c.

Clarified Provisions

Clarified provisions comprise a third category. Like defined and explained provisions, these are unclear to the receiving party. On hearing
the drafting party's explanation, however, the receiving party does not
accept the text but suggests that the drafting party could better express
its intent by changing the language. In essence, the receiving party's reaction is that the provision is acceptable in substance, but poorly drafted.
The parties will then propose a series of alternative formulations until
they find one that is mutually acceptable. In the case of the receiving
party, the test will be whether the new wording more clearly expresses
the meaning of the provision as the drafting party explained it. In the
case of the drafting party, which probably regards its original formulation as the most desirable, the test will be twofold: (1) is the alternative
formulation sufficiently clear; and (2) does the alternative formulation
amount to, or appear to amount to, a substantive concession?
The latter question is particularly serious in negotiations of multiple
treaties from a single model text. In such a case the drafting party is on
public record as preferring a particular formulation. Observers poten-

66.

For an example of a defined provision and a concurring view that a defined

provision must be interpreted in light of the explanation of the drafting party as gleaned
from the negotiating history, see 769th Meeting, supra note 39, at 288 (Comments of
Robert Ago).
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tially may construe every deviation from the model text, however superficial, as a derogation rather than as a clarification. The drafting party
will look, in the first instance, for existing formulations in other treaties
that have an established meaning equivalent to that in the draft.
An example of a clarified provision in the BITs appears in article
11(4) of the BIT between the United States and Senegal." This article
requires, in pertinent part, that each party observe any "engagement" it
may have entered into with respect to investment.68 The model text had
used the word "commitment," which the Senegalese negotiators believed
was less clear in French."9 The negotiators did not intend to affect the
meaning of the provision by making the change; they intended only to
find a written formulation which, in the view of both parties, clearly
expressed the parties' agreement.
A clarified provision, like an explained provision, is one in which the
drafting party's explanation of its intention forms the core of the agreement. The text the parties finally adopt is acceptable because both parties agree that it adequately reflects that explanation. A court that confines its interpretation to a reading of the bare text interprets the
reflection of the parties' agreement and not the agreement itself.
d.

Reworded Provisions

Reworded provisions are those in which the form of the provision is
objectionable to the receiving party for reasons other than the provision's
failure to convey adequately the underlying meaning. An excellent example, in the case of the BITs, was the reference to the interest that an
expropriating government must pay to an expropriated investor for any
period of delay in providing compensation for the expropriation, a reference the Moroccan negotiators found offensive on religious grounds. The
parties replaced all references to interest with general language creating
a right to compensation for delays in receipt of payment. They retained
the substance of the right to interest, but with rewording to accommodate
a particular sensitivity.7
The negotiation of a reworded provision, like that of a clarified provision, proceeds in three steps. First, the receiving party will articulate the
basis of its objection. Second, the drafting party will reply that the objection appears to be one of form only and it will articulate the underlying
principle that it believes both parties are prepared to accept. Third, the
67.

Senegal BIT, supra note 60, art. 11(4).

68. Id.
69. See Vandevelde, supra note 61.

70. Id.
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parties will begin their search for a new formulation that preserves the
principle while avoiding the receiving party's objection. In the case of the
reworded provision, as in that of the clarified provision, the parties will
mutually agree on the drafting party's intention with respect to the principle, changing only the form of the treaty text. The receiving party will
seek a new formulation that avoids a particular word or phrase, even
though in substance it has no objection. The drafting party will seek to
avoid formulations that the other party may later interpret as substantive
concessions or which may obscure the principle.
The language the parties finally adopt will be acceptable to them because it will appear to express adequately the underlying principle on
which both parties concur. While the language may be an acceptable
formulation of the principle, the parties' minds met in fact on the principle itself. A court that interprets the provision as anything other than an
embodiment of the principle will have misinterpreted the parties'
agreement.
e.

Modified Provisions

Modified provisions are provisions that the receiving party finds unacceptable in substance. The parties will reach agreement on the provision
only after the drafting party agrees to modifications that represent substantive concessions.
It is useful to distinguish among three types of modified provisions:
explained, defined and unexplained. An explained modified provision is
one where a party offers new language, discusses the provision with the
other party, and they reach an agreement acceptable to both. As in the
case of explained, clarified and reworded provisions, the parties reach an
agreement which they embody in words. Unlike the explained, clarified
or reworded provisions, however, the intent that ultimately becomes their
mutual agreement originates not with the drafting party but with both
parties. The parties adopt the wording used because they believe it reflects their shared intention. Again, the negotiations and the meeting of
minds that resulted therefrom are the heart of the agreement; the text is
only an effort to reduce the agreement to words. A court that examines
only the text has missed the agreement.
One can find an illustration of an explained modified provision in paragraph 1 of the Protocol to the BIT between the United States and Zaire
(Zaire BIT).71 Article V(1) of that BIT, following the United States
proposal, guarantees to investors of either party the right to make cur71.

Zaire BIT, supra note 60.
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rency transfers related to an investment freely in and out of the territory
of the other party.72 The Protocol to the Zaire BIT modified the general
rule, however, in that it permits Zaire, under certain exigent circumstances, to allow the transfer of sale or liquidation proceeds "over a period [of] three years."'7 3 The parties agreed to the modification only after
they had reached an understanding in principle that Zaire would make a
good faith effort to permit meaningful transfers throughout the three
years, although they agreed not to quantify Zaire's obligation. 4 The
parties believed the "over a three year period" formulation adequately
reflected the understanding in principle. A court that considers only the
bare text could interpret it defensibly to permit Zaire to make no effort
to allow transfer until the last day of the period, but such a reading
would not reflect the parties' agreement, notwithstanding its facial consistency with the text.
A defined modified provision is one where one of the parties proffers
the new language without explanation. Subsequent discussions define
certain terms but, unlike the case of the explained modified provision,
these discussions do not go to the heart of the entire provision. The text
forms the core of the agreement, but it is the text as defined, not the bare
text.
An example of a defined modified provision is article II(3)(a) of the
BIT between the United States and Senegal."5 The 1983 draft language
that the United States proposed authorized the parties to require that the
right of the other party's investors to engage in mining on the public
domain be based on reciprocity, a derogation from the general rule of
national and most-favored-nation treatment set forth in the BIT. Senegal
proposed that the parties broaden the provision to refer to mining activities and not just mining. 6 During negotiations, the parties agreed that
"mining activities" would include mining and any initial transformation
of a mined product.7 7 A court that reads the term more narrowly or
more broadly than the definition to which the parties agreed would misinterpret the agreement.
An unexplained modified provision is one where one party offers and
the other party accepts new language without discussion of its meaning.
In one sense the unexplained modified provision is similar to a noncon-

72. Id. art. V(1).

73. Zaire BIT, supra note 60, Protocol, para. 1(b).
74. Vandevelde, supra note 61.
75. Senegal BIT, supra note 60, art. II(3)(a).
76. Vandevelde, supra note 61.

77. Id.
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troverted provision. Certainly, several statements of intent may have preceded the provision. At the critical moment, however, the record falls
silent and we are left with only the final text and perhaps some inconclusive discussions preceding agreement on the text. One can distinguish
these discussions from the internal expressions of intent referred to in the
case of noncontroverted provisions because here they have been communicated to the other party. Inasmuch as the parties compromised, however, one cannot presume that either side has accepted the other side's
intent. In that sense, the discussions are comparable to the internal expressions of intent. The discussions may set the limits of the interpretive
process, but within those limits the court will have to impose its own
objective view of the provision.
Article II(1) and (2) of the Zaire BIT provides an illustration of an
unexplained modified provision. 8 The 1983 draft that the United States
proposed for adoption required the parties to provide national and mostfavored-nation treatment to new and existing investment of nationals and
companies of the other party "in like situations." 9 The Zaire BIT, inexplicably insofar as the author has been able to ascertain, omits reference
to "in like situations" from the paragraph relating to the treatment of
existing investments. 80 It is unclear which party proposed the change or
what effect it intended the change to have. The interpreter is left with
only the bare text to interpret as an objective third party would.
In the case of the unexplained modified provisions, as with noncontroverted provisions, a meeting of minds may never have occurred other
than the agreement that specific words should appear in the treaty text.
Each party is content to see the provision in the light most favorable to
its own position. Indeed, the parties may avoid clarification out of fear
that it would only expose conflict and result in an explanation that
would force one party to back away from the language. 8'
IV.

TREATY INTERPRETATION:

A

NEGOTIATOR'S PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of the foregoing case study was to illustrate the diverse
ways in which parties to a treaty reach agreement on individual provisions. In each case the manner in which the parties negotiated a provision suggests the proper approach to its interpretation.
In some cases, for example, the plain language of the text is all that
passed between the parties. The parties did not agree on any underlying
78.
79.
80.
81.

Zaire BIT, supra note 60, arts. 11(1), (2).
Vandevelde, supra note 61.
Zaire BIT, supra note 60.
See 766th Meeting, supra note 54, at 289-90 (Comments of Shabtai Rosenne).
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principle or imbue the text with any special meaning. A court that examines that plain language has as much information about the meaning
of the agreement as the parties did. Such cases include noncontroverted
provisions and unexplained modified provisions. Under those circumstances, it is wholly appropriate for the court to regard the agreement as
consisting of the text itself and to interpret that text objectively-that is,
to adopt the textual approach.
In other cases, however, the parties agreed to include a particular text
only after they discussed what they intended that provision to mean.
That is, the parties accepted a particular formulation as an adequate
expression of the underlying principle that they found mutually acceptable in the course of the negotiations. The underlying principle, not the
text, was the essence of the agreement. These cases include explained,
clarified, reworded and explained modified provisions. In such cases a
court should regard the agreement as consisting of a standard, not a rule,
and interpret it subjectively. The court should adopt the subjective
approach.
In still other cases, prior to accepting a provision, the receiving party
sought assurances that the parties would interpret a word or phrase in a
particular manner. The discussions did not focus on the provision as a
whole, but concerned only the meaning of a word or phrase. Such cases
include defined and defined modified provisions. In these cases courts
should regard the provision as a rule, not a standard, and interpret it
subjectively-that is, in accordance with the parties' actual meaning.
Thus, the quasi-textual approach is appropriate.
These examples illustrate the interpretation of certain types of treaty
provisions from a negotiator's perspective. The provisions considered
were those the case study identified. As previously noted, the case study
did not purport to be an exhaustive list of the types of provisions found
in bilateral series agreements, to say nothing of international agreements
generally. 2 The limited number of provisions considered above, however, provides a sufficient basis for identifying the premises that underlie
the negotiator's perspective.
The negotiator's perspective requires a theory of interpretation based
on three premises. The first premise is that the primary purpose of

82. Treaty negotiators may reach agreement through numerous routes, of which this
essay has discussed only a few. One can imagine countless other categories of provisions.
An obvious addition to the list is the explained noncontroverted provision-a provision
with respect to which the drafting party provides the receiving party with voluminous
explanatory materials, following which the receiving party accepts the provision without
discussion.
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treaty interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the parties rather
than simply to settle a dispute by recourse to a third-party interpretation. That is, the negotiator's perspective, in contrast to the court's perspective, prefers subjectivism to objectivism.
The corollary, however, is a recognition that at times the parties will
not have had any intention on a particular issue or that their intention
will be impossible to identify from the negotiating history. In such cases
the negotiator's perspective recognizes the legitimacy of a third-party,
objectivist interpretation as a means of settling the dispute. s3
The current international law of treaty interpretation is profoundly
objectivist, allowing subjectivism only where a party sustains a heavy
burden of proof, as in the quasi-textual approach, or where objectivism
has failed. The negotiator's perspective calls for a reversal of this presumption: courts would seek to interpret treaty provisions subjectively,
reserving objectivism for cases where it is clear the parties had no subjective intent on the issue in dispute or where, because of gaps in the record, the court could not discern that intent.
The second premise is that most treaties are a mixture of rules and
standards. At times the parties will have reached clear agreement on a
standard which they then seek to embody in language. A negotiator's
perspective recognizes that the underlying standard was the essence of
their agreement and, if the record reveals it, the underlying standard
should form the basis of interpretation. At other times, however, the parties will have incorporated a rule into the agreement with little or no
discussion, or will have been unable to agree in principle and will have
agreed to unexplained language to bridge the gap. In these cases a negotiator's perspective recognizes that the rule is the agreement and it is the
proper subject of interpretation.
The third premise is that courts should examine disputed treaty provisions in every case in light of the treaty's negotiating history. 4 Only

83. Jacobs, supra note 15, at 339. Once it has abandoned the search for the parties'
actual meaning in favor of a third-party interpretation, a court has the choice of acting
either arbitrarily or on the basis of some guiding principles. A principled interpretation
may be hardly different from an arbitrary one if the principles are arbitrarily selected.
Thus, a court that seeks to make a principled interpretation first must find a legitimate
basis on which to choose the principles to be applied. Unfortunately, the negotiator's
perspective, as formulated herein, offers no guidance in this regard. Treaty negotiators
generally operate on a "black box" theory of international law: they assume the existence
of some set of principles that will enable a court to fill in interpretive gaps, but will
rarely allow speculation as to the nature of those principles to intrude into the treatymaking process.
84. For a concurring view, see, e.g., Lauterpacht, supra note 30, at 433.
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through such an examination can a court determine whether a rule or a
standard was the essence of the agreement and whether a subjectivist or
an objectivist theory of interpretation is more appropriate under the circumstances of the negotiation.
One can state the difference between a court's perspective and a negotiator's perspective rather simply: a court's perspective regards all treaty
provisions as ideally the same-as rules that courts should interpret objectively. One determines whether to depart from this ideal and treat a
provision as a standard or to apply a subjectivist theory of interpretation
by examining the bare text alone.
A negotiator's perspective, on the other hand, recognizes that agreements have rules and standards, and that both subjectivism and objectivism are legitimate under certain circumstances. One determines whether
to treat a provision as a rule or a standard and whether to apply an
objectivist or subjectivist theory of interpretation by examining the negotiating history."5
V.

CONCLUSION

The traditional international law of treaty interpretation, as embodied
in the Vienna Convention, is almost purposely inadequate to the two
tasks of treaty interpretation previously identified: enforcing the parties'
agreement where there is one and supplying a legitimate interpretation
where there is not. First, the traditional law of treaty interpretation in
many cases does not even attempt to identify the parties' actual intent
85. Commentators are showing increasing recognition that the attempt to formulate a
single approach for interpreting treaty provisions is misguided. The most obvious distinction to be made is that between bilateral and multilateral agreements. A negotiator's
perspective is that the manner in which these two types of agreements are negotiated is
very different and thus they necessitate different approaches to interpretation. For a reference to the particular problem of multilateral treaty negotiations, see Reservations to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory
Opinion), 1951 I.C.J. 15, 49-53 (May 28) (dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez); Summary Records of the 873rd Meeting, 1966 I Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 207, U.N. Ddc. A/
CN.4/186 (Comments of Gilberto Amado); 766th Meeting, supra note 54, at 287 (Comments of Milan Bartos); A. McNAIR, supra note 28, at 412 (1945); Fitzmaurice, 1951,
supra note 20, at 3-4. At least one commentator, without going quite that far, has suggested that a general reservation for constituent instruments of international organizations be included in the Vienna Convention. See 765th Meeting, supra note 30, at 278
(Comments of Shabtai Rosenne). Falk has commented on the need for "more functionally specific conceptions of interpretation that give adequate weight to [the relative roles
of text and context in the interpretative process]." Falk, supra note 28, at 345. Falk
suggests that an important distinction is whether a treaty relates to war and peace or
some more prosaic subject.
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but remains content with the court's objective interpretation. Second,
traditional law simply does not acknowledge the situation in which the
parties' agreement is not determinant of the dispute and, thus, it has not
developed a theory of interpretation that can legitimate treaty interpretation in such cases.
The negotiator's perspective, by contrast, seeks to uncover the parties'
actual agreement in every case in which it can be found. Where there
was no agreement on the point at issue or the agreement can no longer
be found, the negotiator's perspective accepts the legitimacy of law-making under an objectivist theory of interpretation as a means of resolving
the dispute in accordance with the parties' agreed procedures.
This leaves open the question of what principles should guide that
process of law-making. We cannot find a solution, however, until we
admit that there is a problem.

